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WHICH SMALL TOWNS ATTRACT START-UPS
AND WHY? TWENTY YEARS OF EVIDENCE
FROM IOWA
GEORGEANNE M. ARTZ, YOUNJUN KIM, PETER F. ORAZEM, AND
PETER J. HAN
Using data on a sample of small Iowa towns consistently collected over two decades, we investigate how
agglomeration economies, social capital, human capital, local fiscal policy, and natural amenities affect
new firm entry. We find that human capital and agglomeration are more conducive to new firm entry
than are natural amenities, local fiscal policy, or social capital. The impact of local fiscal policy is too
small to overcome the locational disadvantages from insufficient endowment of human capital and
agglomeration. A rural development approach that encourages firm entry in rural towns with the larg-
est endowments of human capital and market agglomeration would be more successful than trying to
raise firm entry in every town.
Key words: agglomeration, firm location, human capital, rural.
JEL codes: M13, R11, R39.
Local economic growth has been tied to
agglomeration economies, human capital,
local fiscal policy, social capital, and natural
amenities.1 However, it is less clear whether
these same factors are important for the
growth of small rural towns. To address this
concern, this study uses a unique longitudinal
data set including ninety-eight small Iowa
towns over twenty years to identify the rela-
tive importance of these factors in stimulating
small town growth.
Small rural towns face economic distress.
Figure 1 shows elements of that distress in non-
metro towns in the U.S.2 Panel (a) represents
smoothed changes from 2000 to 2016 in the
self-employment rate, defined as the change in
the share of total employment that are self-
employed. This panel shows that business activ-
ities as measured by self-employment fell in all
sizes of rural towns and that the declinewas larg-
est in small rural towns with a population of
10,000 or less.3 Panel (b) shows the smoothed
changes in the employment-to-population ratio
for those same communities over the 2000–16
period. The employment rate fell in all sizes of
rural towns, and the largest declines were in
the smallest rural towns. Taking the two graphs
together, the smallest towns experienced the
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2Data are obtained from the 2000 Census and the 2014–2018
American Community Survey. To obtain a time-consistent geo-
graphical unit of place (e.g. town or city), we converted 2010 Cen-
sus Tracts to 2000 using a crosswalk developed by Logan, Xu, and
Stults (2014). Then we allocated 2000 Tracts to places using a
crosswalk from Missouri Census Data Center. Non-metro classifi-
cations are obtained from 2003 rural–urban continuum codes. We
drop towns below 500 population in 2000 to obtain reliable
statistics.
3Rural population started to decline in the early 2010s, the first
recorded time period of rural population decline
(Cromartie 2017).
largest declines in the rate of self-employment
and an even greater decline in employment
rates. These graphs indicate that the greatest
economic distress is occurring in the smallest
rural towns below 10,000 population. Our study
will examine which factors encourage or dis-
courage new firm entry in these small towns
and suggest policy implications addressing eco-
nomic distress in small rural towns.
Most previous studies of rural economic
growth or decline are based on county-level ana-
lyses (e.g.WuandGopinath2008) including stud-
ies examining the role of social capital on growth
(e.g. Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater 2006).
Because counties contain many communities,
and social capital is a local attribute, county-level
analysis may miss the role of social capital at the
community level. Examples of town-level social
capital studies exist (Kilkenny,Nalbarte, andBes-
ser 1999; Besser and Miller 2013), but the data
cover a small number of towns or short time
periods. Commonly used measures of aggregate
growth in employment or population (Stephens
and Partridge 2011;Rupasingha andGoetz 2013)
may not be as responsive to changing local eco-
nomic conditions because it is costly tomove firm
or residential location. Incumbent firms and
householdsmay remaindespite diminishingpros-
pects, even as entering firms are able to take
changing local economic or social factors into
account in deciding where to locate.
Our study has several advantages that will help
to identify the key growth factors for small towns.
First, we use social capital data consistently col-
lected over two decades for a set of ninety-eight
small towns in Iowa. These data are based on sur-
veysof the local population that cover factors that
are not typically available. If small towns have an
advantage in social capital over more densely
populated areas, and if social capital does attract
newfirmentry, thenwe shouldbe able toobserve
its effects on entrepreneurship over such a long
time span. We characterize social capital impact
by comparing it across time or by the distance
to closest metro areas. We conduct a robustness
check with alternative social capital measures
such as Olson-type (Olson 1982) and Putnam-
type (Putnam 1993) group densities.
Our second advantage is that we use new
firm location decisions as our indicator of local
town growth. New firm location decisions are
more sensitive to changes in local market
Figure 1. Smoothed changes in the self-employment rate and the employment-to-population
ratio in U.S. non-metro towns from 2000 to 2016, by town population
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attributes than are aggregated growth measures
such as employment or population growth
because new firms are choosing from many
alternative towns in deciding where to locate.
In contrast, aggregate net employment or popu-
lation growth will be dominated by the high
fixed costs of changing location for incumbent
firms and employees. The greater the costs of
relocation, the more current location of deci-
sions of incumbent firms will reflect past town
attributes as opposed to current market
attributes.
Third, local factors are predetermined at the
time of new firm location decisions, which
reduces the concern of reverse causality. Mea-
sures of social capital may reflect past firm entry
as opposed to inducing the entry, for example,
clouding the identification of the causal relation-
ships. In addition, individual firms will be too
small to alter measured aggregate market attri-
butes, and so we can more clearly show how
market factors affect firm entry than we can
identify how market factors affect aggregate
employment or population, which themselves
would alter the measured market factors.
Fourth, we measure agglomeration econo-
mieswithfive different agglomerationmeasures:
cluster specialization, local competition, access
to upstream firms, access to downstream firms,
and industrial diversity. These measures have
been shown to affect firm entry in metropolitan
areas and in rural counties (Artz, Kim, andOra-
zem 2016) but have not been tested for their
importance to the growth of small rural towns.
Our analysis is based on new firm location
decisions using NETS (National Establishment
Time Series) data. Small towns find it difficult to
attract new firm entry on average, but there is
substantial variation in the pace of new firm entry
across the ninety-eight towns in our sample. The
new firm entry rate, measured as the number of
new firms relative to incumbent firms, was 4%
on average in the early 1990s, ranging from
1.4% to 11.4%. The average rose to 8% in the
early 2000s. The firm entry rate declined to 2%
by the early 2010s with a range of 0.2% to 5%.4
We will use this variation to test which local fac-
tors are more important for new firm entry in
these small rural towns andwhether their impacts
have changed over time. We find that human
capital and market agglomeration are more con-
ducive to new firm entry than are natural ameni-
ties, local fiscal policy, or social capital. The
impact of local fiscal policy is too small to over-
come the locational disadvantages from insuffi-
cient endowments of human capital and market
agglomeration. These results are confirmed in a
robustness check of testing whether actual
decadal town employment growth is influenced
by local factors that affect new firm location
choices, finding that local factors that had stron-
ger impacts on new firm entry still have signifi-
cant impacts on employment growth. These
results suggest that a rural development
approach that encourages firm entry in rural
towns with the largest endowments of human
capital andmarket agglomerationwould bemore
successful than trying to foster firm growth in all
towns.
The next section explains the importance of
entrepreneurship as a rural development strat-
egy and reviews local factors related to local
economic growth. Section 3 describes a model,
and section 4 explains variables and data.
Section 5 reports estimation results. The last
section discusses implications of our results to
rural development policies and combines
them with recent findings in the economic
development policy literature.
Literature Review
Entrepreneurship has received much atten-
tion from researchers as a rural development
strategy (Deller and Goetz 2009). As the num-
ber of entrepreneurs and self-employed rise,
rural areas also experience increased employ-
ment and income (Rupasingha and
Goetz 2013). These impacts are confirmed in
more distressed rural areas such as the Appa-
lachian region (Stephens and Partridge 2011).
Job creation is closely related to new firm
births because the majority of jobs are created
by new firms (Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and
Miranda 2013). New firm entry may be critical
to local income growth because new busi-
nesses improve aggregate productivity growth
by facilitating the reallocation of workers
across firms (Alon et al. 2018). Locally owned
businesses may help stabilize local employ-
ment against economic shocks (Kolko and
Neumark 2010). The success or failure of past
entrepreneurs provides entrepreneurial mar-
ketplace information that informs subsequent
4In our calculations using the National Establishment Time Series
(NETS) database, new firm entry rate in similarly sized small rural
Iowa towns is lower than in large rural towns by 0.1 to 2 percentage
points depending on the year. Five-year survival rates of new firms
are higher in small rural towns than in large rural towns by 4 to
12 percentage points. Industry shares of new firms are similar in
small and large rural towns. Employment per firm in small rural
towns is about a half as many as in large rural towns.
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entrepreneurs, and so current entrepreneurial
entry endogenously influences future firm
entry (Bunten et al. 2015). New businesses
often provide goods and services that may
not be otherwise available in their rural com-
munity. Therefore, it is important to identify
the key factors affecting new firm entry for
rural economic growth.
Local factors related to local economic
growth are well documented in the literature.
Agglomeration economies such as the local
concentration of suppliers, customers, edu-
cated workers, technological innovators, and
investors have proven extremely important
for local economic growth and the rise of
cites.5 The economic benefits of agglomera-
tion include lower transportation costs;
greater labor productivity, a better matching
between buyers and sellers or between firms
and workers; and a faster diffusion of technol-
ogy and information (Duranton and Puga
2014). The commonly used agglomeration
measures we focus on include cluster spe-
cialization, local competition, access to
upstream firms, access to downstream firms,
and industrial diversity.6 Marshall (1920)
argued that cluster specialization raised profit-
ability (i.e. more firms in a same industry)
because it may increase knowledge spillover
across firms and save transportation costs of
materials. He also contended that the possibil-
ity of establishing amonopoly at entry because
of the absence of any firms in the sector would
also encourage entry due to the possibility of
internalizing returns to innovation. Por-
ter (1990) emphasized the roles of cluster spe-
cialization and access to upstream and
downstream firms as fostering growth because
these factors increase firm productivity
through knowledge spillovers. In contrast to
Marshall (1920), Porter emphasized local
competition rather than local monopoly
because competition may foster to the devel-
opment and adoption of new technologies.
Jacobs (1969) argued that industrial diversity
was critical for growth in part because new
technologies are often due to knowledge spill-
overs across sectors. All of these measures
have been shown to affect firm entry in both
urban and rural counties (Artz, Kim, and Ora-
zem 2016) but have not been tested for their
importance to the growth of small rural towns
that have experienced the greatest propor-
tional job loss in this century. Several studies
have examined agglomeration effects in rural
areas but have not used the full set of agglom-
eration measures (Henry and Draben-
stott 1996; Gabe 2003).
Another possible reason that agglomera-
tion measures appear to matter for growth
in rural areas is that they are correlated with
other factors not included in the analysis.
Social capital has been claimed to be impor-
tant for local economic growth because it
may reduce transaction costs and promote
the diffusion of information and knowledge
(e.g. Putnam 1993; Knack and Keefer 1997).
If a small town fosters interpersonal relation-
ships characterized by trust and norms of reci-
procity, there may be more sharing of
information that could make up for the lack
of agglomeration (Putnam 1993). Past studies
have shown that social capital can foster inno-
vation (Akçomak and ter Weel 2009),
improve entrepreneurs’ access to capital
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004; Seghers,
Manigart, and Vanacker 2012), lower default
risk on loans (Feigenberg, Field, and
Pande 2013), increase investment (Bottazzi,
Da Rin, and Hellmann 2016), and reduce
crime and poverty (Crandall and Weber 2004;
Buonanno, Montolio, and Vanin 2009). These
benefits can promote firm entry (De Blasio
and Nuzzo 2010) and increase local economic
growth (Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwa-
ter 2006; Bjørnskov 2012).
Kilkenny, Nalbarte, and Besser (1999) and
Besser andMiller (2013) found that rural busi-
ness success was associated with social capital.
Social capital has been found more critical to
rural businesses than to urban businesses,
probably because of resource constraints and
the lack of supporting institutions such as ven-
ture capital firms in rural areas. Social capital
may improve access to resources and informa-
tion in rural areas. Bauernschuster, Falck, and
Heblich (2010) found that social capital
increased the probability of being an entrepre-
neur in smaller towns more than in larger
towns. Similar results are found in Westlund,
Larsson, and Olsson (2014). Freire-Gibb and
Nielsen (2014) found that social capital was
important for business survival in rural areas
but not in urban areas.
However, Westlund and Adam’s (2010)
meta-analysis found that estimated impacts of
social capital on economic growth were mixed.
A possible reason is the lack of consensus on
how social capital is to be measured. Usually,
5For a review, see Duranton and Puga (2014) and Puga (2010).
6For more detailed explanations, see Glaeser et al. (1992) and
Artz, Kim, and Orazem (2016).
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social capital is measured in two ways: trust
and associational involvement.7 The former
measures the sense of faith or common pur-
pose that members of a community have for
one another. The latter measures the number
of associations, such as civic groups, sports
clubs, and religious organization, to which a
respondent belongs, or the total number of
associations in the area. We include both con-
ventional measures in this study. Our survey
responses fit naturally into three different
social capital measures: bonding, bridging
within a community, and bridging across
communities. Bonding capital connects
people within homogeneous groups, whereas
bridging capital connects people across
diverse groups (Putnam 1993; Halstead and
Deller 2015). Few studies have examined
how social capital matters for new firm entry
in small towns or whether bridging or bonding
is more important.
Human capital has been found crucial for
local economic growth because it improves
labor productivity and promotes knowledge
spillover across educated workers
(Lucas 1988). Acs and Armington (2004)
found that human capital increased the proba-
bility of opening a new business in industries
normally requiring college-educated founders.
Rauch (1993) and Moretti (2004) showed that
knowledge spillover across educated workers
exists. Glaeser and Maré (2001) found that
wage growth was faster in urban areas than
in rural areas, probably due to greater knowl-
edge spillover across skilled workers in urban
areas. Winters (2013) showed that the proba-
bility of being employed was higher in areas
with a greater number of skilled workers.
Local fiscal policies—taxes and government
expenditures—may affect new firm entry
because taxes and government expenditures
may influence firm profitability. However,
Arauzo-Carod, Liviano-Solis, and Manjón-
Antolín (2010) reviewed empirical studies
and found that the impacts of taxes on busi-
ness location decisions were ambiguous; some
studies found modest negative impacts, but
other studies did not. These ambiguous results
might be due to a tradeoff between local taxes
and government expenditures. Gabe and
Bell (2004) found that high taxes may not slow
local economic growth because public goods
and services financed by taxes attract
businesses to the area. In other words, the
net impact of taxes and government expendi-
tures on local economic growth may be
positive.
Natural amenities attract workers and
retirees (Graves 1979; Deller et al. 2001).
Tourism may increase labor demand in high-
amenity areas, which may promote local eco-
nomic growth as well (Weiler and Seidl 2004).
Educated workers may migrate toward high-
amenity areas, which may promote the con-
centration of human capital in the areas
(Whisler et al. 2008). However, these positive
impacts of natural amenity on local economic
growth may be attenuated as housing prices
are bid up (Rickman and Rickman 2011).
Our strategy is to admit all of these factors
into a model of firm entry and to let the data
tell us which are most important for attracting
new firm entry into small towns.
Model
We present a model of a firm’s location deci-
sion to enter a particular local market in
response to that location’s attributes that
would potentially affect firm profitability rela-
tive to its alternative locations. Assume that
each new firm chooses one town j from a set
of J potential small towns. They will choose
the town that maximizes expected present
value of profit.8 The expected present value
of profit for firm i in industry k, town j and year
t is
ð1Þ πikjt =M0kjt−1γM + S0jt−1γS +Fjt−1γF
+AjγA + εi + εk + εt + uikjt
Mkjt-1 represents a vector of factors that are
hypothesized to strengthen the local market
forfirmentry includingmeasures of localmarket
agglomeration, local demographic attributes
such as education and household income, the
distance to the nearest metropolitan area, and
an indicator if the town is a county seat.9 The
7Halstead and Deller (2015) provide a good review of these
issues.
8New firm entry would affect local wages or rents in a way to
reduce local profitability to zero, and the spatial equilibriumwould
be achieved. However, if local factors increase local profitability
persistently, new firms will continue to enter the area.
9We do not include area population because population varia-
tions in the sample towns were limited. Sample towns were picked
from small towns with a population of between 500 and 10,000.
Moreover, population, or at least in migration, would be an alter-
native dependent variable and would cause endogeneity bias if
included as a regressor.
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distance to the nearest metropolitan area is used
to capture the potential benefits or costs of prox-
imity to a larger market. Larger neighbors could
provide complementary public goods to firms in
the small town, but they also present potential
competitionwith those samefirms. The informa-
tion is lagged by one year to signify that the
information is known at the time of entry rather
than responding to current firm entry decisions.
Social capital measures make up the vector
Sjt-1. Local fiscal variable Fjt-1, and natural
amenitiesAj also shape the firm’s expectations
of the town’s relative prospects. The error
term, εi, is an unobserved firm-i-specific profit-
ability that reflects the entrepreneur’s skills,
which will be common across all markets. εk
represents industry-k-specific factors that will
be common across all locations. The temporal
shock, εt, is a common cyclical shock for all
firms entering business in year t. The last term
uikjt is a random shock to profits for firm i in
town j that is assumed to be uncorrelated with
all other factors.
Firms will choose town j to maximize
expected net present value of profit, and so
the chosen town will satisfy the condition















Notice that the unobserved firm- and sector-
specific unobserved effects and the common
cyclical effect are differenced away. The equa-
tion can be estimated using the conditional
logit model by assuming that the difference in
the error term uikjt−uikj0t follows the type-1
extreme value distribution. However, for prac-
tical convenience, we estimate the equation
using the Poisson regression with group
dummy variables (i.e. sector-year dummy vari-
ables). Guimar~aes, Figueiredo, and Wood-
ward (2004) show that estimation results
from this method are the same as from the
conditional logit estimation.
Our estimation may be biased by omitted
location-specific variables. For example, if a
certain industry is likely to be located near a
highway or airport, our coefficient for cluster
specialization may be overestimated without
controlling for highway or airport proximity.
However, this concern is less pressing in a
study focusing on small Iowa towns. Had
access to a highway or airport been substan-
tially large on small-town growth, the town
would have grown too large to be included in
our sample.
Data
We base our analysis on a unique longitudinal
database composed of ninety-eight small
towns in Iowa. One town with a population
of between 500 and 10,000 was selected from
each of Iowa’s ninety-nine counties.10 Towns
that share a border with a metropolitan city
were not included. Each town was surveyed
in 1994 and then resurveyed in 2004 and
2014.11 One town was dropped from the anal-
ysis because the townwas not surveyed in both
subsequent waves. We define each town by its
zip code. Our universe of firms is defined by all
firms entering any one of those ninety-eight
zip codes in 1995, 2005, or 2014.12 These
ninety-eight small towns have local character-
istics typical of small towns in Iowa as we will
show later. Our operating hypothesis is that
each of these firms had decided to enter a
small Iowa town and could have entered any
of the ninety-eight options in our sample of
towns.13 Each picked one of the ninety-eight
and rejected the other ninety-seven towns.
The firm data were obtained from the
National Establishment Time Series (NETS)
database. The sample was restricted to firms
with a clear profit motive. We excluded gov-
ernment agencies, nonprofit organizations,
and firms with a public service purpose such
as historical sites or museums. We also
excluded firms in agriculture and mining
because their entry decisions are affected by
site-specific land or resource availability.14
We have 4,774 new establishments in our
sample.
10Estimation is conducted at the zip code level rather than the
place level in order to link the firm address to the town. The pop-
ulation of sample zip codes ranges from 500 to 12,000 because
some zip codes include residents in the vicinity of the sample town.
11This data collection project is described in Besser, Harcey, and
Peoples (2015).
12We use 2014 rather than 2015 because new firm entry is avail-
able up to 2014 in our dataset.
13To test this hypothesis, we extend our sample to all small non-
metro towns in Iowaand run an estimationwithout social capitalmea-
sures. We find that the signs of estimates are comparable to our main
results in table 3. Estimation results are reported in the appendix A.
14The excluded industries are as follows: Agriculture (two-digit
NAICS: 11); Mining (21); Postal Service (three-digit NAICS 491);
Monetary Authorities-Central Bank (521); Nursing and Residen-
tial Care Facilities (623); Social Assistance (624); Museums, His-
torical Sites, and Similar Institutions (712); Religious,
Grantmaking, Civic, Professional and Similar Organizations
(813); Private Households (814); and Public Administration (92).
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NETS has the advantage that it reports the
zip code of each firm and so we could locate
the firms in the ninety-eight small towns. An
alternative not open to us was to get restricted
use individual firm data accessible at a Census
Data Center. NETS has limitations compared
to Census Bureau business data. Barnatchez,
Crane, and Decker (2017) compare NETS
with Census Bureau business data (county
business patterns, and non-employer statis-
tics) and find that the former includes fewer
businesses than the latter. However, the
authors report that NETS has a high degree
of consistency with Census Bureau business
data in terms of the geographic distribution
of businesses. Crane and Decker (2019) com-
pare NETS with another Census Bureau busi-
ness data (business dynamics statistics) in
terms of new firm entry rate (i.e., share of
new establishment count to existing establish-
ment count) and find that the rates are compa-
rable in both datasets in our sample years. To
sum up, although NETS does not cover the
universe of businesses in the United States,
NETS mimics official business data in terms
of geographic distribution of businesses and
entry rate.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for all
the variables we use to explain incentives to
enter a market. For each town, a random sam-
ple of 150 households was selected from tele-
phone directories in 1994, 2004, and 2014.
The response rates were 72%, 67%, and
41.5%, respectively. Social capital was mea-
sured with same survey questions over the
two decades. Questions address work, shop-
ping, and entertainment decisions as well as
attitudes toward their town and their fellow
citizens. These questions provide us a long-
term evolution of commonly used measures
of social capital in these cities rather than the
single cross section typically available in past
studies. The twelve survey questions used to
measure the evolution of social capital in the
ninety-eight towns are summarized in
Table 2.15 Principal component analysis of
the twelve items determined that their covari-
ance could be adequately summarized with
three linear combinations of the data. The var-
iables were grouped rather naturally into
three categories that corresponded with the
literature on social capital. Bonding was com-
posed of questions that measured the extent
of close personal and group relationships in
each town. Bridging within community com-
bines measures of how easily members of the
community can cooperate with each other.
Bridging across communities combines items
that reflect openness to new people or ideas.16
If social capital raises local firm profitability,
towns with more social capital will have a fas-
ter pace of new firm entry.
We created several different measures of
local market agglomeration using the NETS
data. By aggregating across firms within four-
digit North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) codes for each firm and zip
code, we are able to derive measures of cluster
specialization, local competition, access to
upstream firms, access to downstream firms,
and industrial diversity.17 These measures are
industry-zip code-specific and constructed
using various aggregations of the firm-level
data in the NETS database. Cluster specializa-
tion (CLUkj) is measured as the relative size of
the proportion of establishments in industry
k in zip code j to the proportion of establish-
ments in industry k in Iowa:
ð3Þ CLUkj = Establishments in k, jAll establishments in j=
Establishments in k in Iowa
All establishments in Iowa
:
The local competition index (COMkj) takes
a value of 1 if zip code area j has any incum-
bent firms in industry k, and 0 otherwise.
Access to upstream (UPkj) or downstream
(DOWNkj) firms measures the relative avail-
ability of suppliers and customers in industry









where Nsj is the number of establishments in
an upstream industry s in zip code j, and Ns is
15More details about the survey questions are available in the
appendix B.
16Although the combination of questions into the three groups
appeared logical, principal component analysis applied to each
subgroup also showed that the elements of each group were
closely related to one another. The first principal component for
bonding, bridging within community, and bridging across commu-
nities explained 65%, 73%, and 78% of its covariance,
respectively.
17This industrial grouping is based on the 1997 input–output
table from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. It has 126 industry
groups, but only those with at least one new firm entry in a given
sample year are used in estimations. The number of industry
groups in our sample is 67, 76, and 58 in 1995, 2005, and 2014,
respectively.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
New firm entry year (1) 1995 (2) 2005 (3) 2014 (4) Pooled
Agglomeration measures
Cluster specialization 0.68 (2.00) 0.78 (2.69) 0.85 (2.41) 0.77 (2.40)
Local competition 0.40 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 0.53 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50)
Industrial diversity 0.87 (0.04) 0.90 (0.04) 0.90 (0.03) 0.89 (0.04)
Proximity to upstream firms 0.05 (0.11) 0.04 (0.10) 0.05 (0.09) 0.05 (0.10)
Proximity to downstream firms 0.05 (0.20) 0.04 (0.09) 0.05 (0.09) 0.04 (0.14)
Human capital
Share of adults (25+) with at least associate
college degree
0.18 (0.05) 0.21 (0.06) 0.29 (0.07) 0.23 (0.07)
Median household income (2013$, $1,000) 45.03 (7.80) 51.39 (8.77) 55.08 (10.48) 50.34 (9.86)
Social capital measures
Bonding social capital 6.39 (1.46) 5.83 (1.35) 4.78 (1.46) 5.71 (1.56)
Bridging within community 7.88 (2.01) 6.78 (2.06) 7.94 (2.25) 7.48 (2.17)
Bridging across communities 7.15 (0.86) 6.48 (0.97) 4.88 (1.51) 6.24 (1.45)
Other market measures
Government expenditure-to-tax ratio in
county
2.30 (0.39) 2.99 (0.79) 3.26 (1.03) 2.84 (0.87)
Amenity index 2.24 (1.06)
Distance to closest MSA (1,000 miles) 0.05 (0.02)
Share of towns with county seat 0.21 (0.41)
# of sector–zip code cells 6,566 7,448 5,684 19,698
Note:The number of towns is ninety-eight. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Most covariates are one-year lagged. Education and income are five-
year lagged in the first and second columns. Government expenditure-to-tax ratio was three-year lagged in the first column.
Table 2. Construction of Social Capital Measures





1. About what proportion of the adults living in this
community would you say you know by name?
2.47 0.37 65%
2. About what proportion of your close personal adult
FRIENDS live in this community?
3.70 0.67
3. (From a list provided), about howmany local groups in
total do you belong to in this community?
1.61 0.65
Bridging within a community
1. Rate (town), 1 = unfriendly and 7 = friendly 4.47 0.42 73%
2. Rate (town), 1 = indifferent and 7 = supportive 3.91 0.43
3. Rate (town), 1 = not trusting and 7 = trusting 4.02 0.44
4. Being a resident in this community is like being with a
group of close friends.a
3.42 0.38
5. I believe that “every person for themselves” is a good
description of this community.a (reverse coded)
3.50 0.40
6. When something needs to get done here, the whole
community gets behind it.a
3.29 0.37
Bridging across communities
1. Rate (town), 1 = prejudiced and 7 = tolerant 4.17 0.58 78%
2. Rate (town), 1 = rejecting of new ideas and 7 = open to
new ideas
4.00 0.62
3. Residents in this community are receptive to new
residents taking leadership positions.a
3.15 0.53
a: 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. Weights are derived from the first principal component in each group. The means and the principal component
analysis are weighted by town population.
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the number of establishments in industry s in
Iowa. The second term is the proportion of
input purchases made by firms in industry










where Nsj is the number of establishments in a
downstream industry s in zip code j, and Ns is
the number of establishments in industry s in
Iowa. The second term is the proportion of
output purchases made by firms in industry
s from industry k. The input–output linkages
are obtained from 1997 Standard Use
Table from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The last measure, industrial diversity (DIVj)
is measured by






where Skj  [0, 1] is the share of all zip code
j establishments that are in sector k. The term
in parentheses on the right-hand-side is a
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of industrial
concentration computed as the sum of squared
establishment count shares. DIVj is the oppo-
site of the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, and
so it reflects the opposite of concentration.
DIVj ranges in values from 0 to 1, where values
closer to one indicate greater industrial
diversity.
The measure of incumbent competitors in
the market could encourage or discourage
entry depending on whether it signals a local
comparative advantage in the sector or the
possibility of exploiting a monopoly opportu-
nity. The other agglomeration measures
should all encourage entry based on past
empirical and theoretical studies. Concentra-
tions of human capital are also considered an
advantage to new firms seeking a ready supply
of skilled labor and consumers with purchas-
ing power. We include two indicators of local
human capital. Average education (EDUj) is
measured by the proportion of residents over
age twenty-five with at least a two-year college
degree in the zip code. High average marginal
products in the local population is indicated by
zip code-level median household income. All
demographic information was obtained from
the Decennial Census and the 2009–2013
American Community Survey (Manson
et al. 2019).
Education and income levels in our sample
of towns are typical of similarly sized Iowa
towns. In the first column of table 1, the aver-
age share (0.18) of adults with at least an asso-
ciate’s degree for sample towns in 1990 is the
same as for other small towns in Iowa. The
average median household income ($45K) is
close to the average ($47.5K) for other small
towns in Iowa. We compare other local char-
acteristics not listed in table 1, such as old pop-
ulation share, white population share, and
manufacturing employment share, and find
that sample towns are representative of small
Iowa towns in general.
Local fiscal policy (Fj) is measured by the
ratio of government expenditures to taxes in
the county, which is obtained from the Annual
Survey of State and Local Government
Finances, U.S. Census Bureau. The ratio can
be greater than one due to intergovernmental
transfers from the federal government to a
local government or debt financing. Areas that
receive more public expenditures than they
pay for using local taxes would be more attrac-
tive to entrants. Natural amenities (Aj) are
measured by the Economic Research Service
at U.S. Department of Agriculture
(McGranahan 1999). A better endowment of
amenities will attract entry. The distance to
the nearest metropolitan area is obtained from
the authors’ calculation using geographic
information system software. Proximity to a
metropolitan area could raise or lower profit-
ability depending on whether the adverse
effects of added competition is dominated by
the greater access to customers. We also
include a dummy variable indicating whether
the town is a county seat.
Results
Estimation results are reported in table 3. All
estimated coefficients in the agglomeration
group except for cluster specialization are pos-
itive and significant. Consistent with Marshall
and Porter, proximity to upstream and down-
stream firms in the sector attracts entry. In
these small towns, having at least one incum-
bent firm in the sector (competition dummy)
attracts entry. This is partially consistent with
Porter in that local competition raises new firm
entry, although Porter argued that greater
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concentration of incumbents should make a
difference, but the cluster measure does not
affect entry. Jacobs’ idea that a mix of sectors
attracts firms is supported by the positive
effect of our industrial diversity measure.
Higher concentrations of educated people
and higher median household income attract
firm entry. Numerous theoretical papers have
argued that greater concentrations of human
capital can lead to persistent growth which
should attract form entry.18 Higher education
levels also leads to greater disposable income,
which improves the local customer base.
The social capital measures have a less con-
sistent effect on new firm entry. The estimated
coefficient for bonding social capital is signifi-
cant and positive. In small towns, greater
bonding social capital would provide a supply
of friends and local organizations with similar
backgrounds to the entrepreneur who may
help launch a fledgling venture entry. In con-
trast, the estimated coefficients for the two
bridging measures are negative. Apparently
connections across groups or across communi-
ties are not important for firm entry in small
towns.
The rest of the factors are more consis-
tent. Government expenditure-to-tax ratio
is significant and positive, which suggests
that localities that can attract more
resources than they pay for through local
taxes will attract new form entry. Localities
that have greater endowments of natural
amenities also attract new firms. County
seats are more attractive than other small
towns. However, distance to a metro market
does not significantly affect firm entry. The
latter result may reflect the sample strategy
of only including small towns that are more
distant from metros, and so the variation in
distance only includes relatively large dis-
tance with a mean of fifty miles.
To see which variables are more important
to new firm entry in small rural towns, we cal-
culate the average proportional change in
new firm entry probability when each factor
increases by one standard deviation. We first
Table 3. New Firm Location Choices among Ninety-Eight Small Iowa Towns in 1995, 2005, and
2014
Dependent variable: # of new
businesses in year–sector–zip
code cell (1) Estimates
(2) Grouped impact of a one-
standard deviation increase in each
factor
Agglomeration
Cluster specialization <0.001 (0.020) 0.15
Local competition 0.520 (0.092)***
Industrial diversity 6.787 (0.616)***
Proximity to upstream firms 1.196 (0.139)***
Proximity to downstream firms 0.366 (0.059)***
Human capital
Education 2.870 (0.345)*** 0.22
Median Income 0.020 (0.003)***
Social capital
Bonding social capital 0.143 (0.019)*** 0.03
Bridging within community −0.043 (0.011)***
Bridging across communities −0.043 (0.021)**
Other market factors
Govt. expenditure-to-tax ratio 0.056 (0.020)*** 0.05
Amenity 0.059 (0.016)*** 0.06
Distance to closest MSA −0.416 (0.831) —






Note: Poisson estimates are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. The model includes sector-year dummy variables. The second column reports the




18See Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) for two early examples.
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calculate a firm entry probability when a factor
increases by one standard deviation reported
in the last column of table 1. Then we divide
this probability by 1/98, which is a propor-
tional change in new firm entry probability.
Recall that our sample has ninety-eight towns.
We repeat this calculation for each factor and
take the average by variable group. As
reported in the last column of table 3, human
capital, measured by education and income,
has the largest effect. Agglomeration has the
second largest effect. Evaluated at sample
means, concentrations of human capital and
agglomeration raise the probability of firm
entry by 37%. Other factors, such as natural
amenities and local fiscal policy raise probabil-
ity of firm entry by an additional 11%.
Because of themixed impacts of the social cap-
ital measures, they only raise firm entry by 3%.
As a result, social capital has too small an
effect to outweigh the importance of agglom-
eration, human capital, amenities, or intergov-
ernmental transfers.
We test whether location choices of new
manufacturing businesses are different from
other new businesses by interacting explana-
tory variables with a dummy variable for
new manufacturing businesses. Location
choices of manufacturing businesses might
be less sensitive to local consumer demand
and suppliers because manufacturing inputs
can be sourced more broadly and outputs
can be sold to more remote customers. The
baseline is location choices of new non-
manufacturing businesses, which are
reported in the first column of table 4. Differ-
ences in location choices between
manufacturing and non-manufacturing busi-
nesses are captured by estimates in the sec-
ond column. A null hypothesis that all
interaction term coefficients are zero is
rejected at the 1% significance level in the
likelihood-ratio test. Estimated elasticities
or proportional entry probability changes
are reported in table 5.19 Location choices of
manufacturing businesses are similar to other
businesses overall. However, local consumer
demand measured by income is less impor-
tant for new manufacturers than for non-
manufacturing businesses. Proximity to
upstream suppliers is less critical for new
manufacturers than for other businesses, but
the elasticity difference is small. New manu-
facturers are more attracted by a larger pool
of educated residents, by local fiscal policy,
and by county-seat towns.
To see whether the importance of local fac-
tors on small town firm entry has changed over
time, we interact explanatory variables with
year dummy variables. The baseline is new
firm location choices in 1995, which are
reported in the first column of table 6. Differ-
ences in location choices between 1995 and
2005 are captured by estimates in the second
column. Differences in location choices
between 1995 and 2014 are caught by esti-
mates in the third column. A null hypothesis
that all interaction term coefficients are zero
is rejected at the 1% significance level in the
likelihood-ratio test. Estimated elasticities
are provided in table 7. Most agglomeration
and education estimates are significant and
positive throughout the sample period, and
their elasticities are stable. These results sug-
gest that agglomeration and human capital
retain their prominent role in encouraging
firm entry over the entire twenty-year period.
Among three social capital measures, bridging
within community estimate is significant and
negative through the sample period, which
suggests that the bridging social capital has dis-
couraged new firm entry over the entire
twenty-year period. Other social capital esti-
mates are not significant. Amenities increase
in importance over time. It did not play a role
in new firm entry in small towns in 1995. How-
ever, by 2014, its estimate becomes weakly sig-
nificant, influencing the choice of which small
town to enter.
Social capital might be more important for
towns that are more remotely sited and so
more reliant on their own culture or social cap-
ital than on a nearby larger town. Moreover, it
is possible that social capital makes up for
missing agglomeration, and so social capital
would increase in importance as agglomera-
tion declines. To test these possibilities, we
interact social capital measures with the dis-
tance. This interaction term allows us to calcu-
late the threshold distance where the sign of
social-capital impact is flipped. In the first col-
umn of table 8, the interaction term of bonding
social capital with the distance has a significant
and positive estimated coefficient, whereas
bonding social capital itself does not. These
results suggest that the impact of bonding
social capital is positive regardless of the dis-
tance to metro area and its impact is greater
in more remote towns. Social network with
19Elasticities are calculated from the Poisson model. Elasticities
from the Poissonmodel go closer to ones from the conditional logit
model as the number of choice alternatives increases
(Schmidheiny and Brülhart 2011).
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friends and local groups may become more
critical in opening businesses in more remote
towns because remote towns may have greater
constraints on resources and information for
businesses. Bridging within the community
has a negative effect in closer proximity to the
metro. Its effect eventually turns positive as dis-
tance from the closest metro area increases
beyond 111 miles (0.084/0.757 × 1,000). Because
the mean distance is fifty miles, bridging within
the community would have a negative impact
on most towns in our sample. We do the same
analysis on bridging across communities. Its
impact is positive up to thirty-one miles from
the closest metro area but turns negative beyond
that distance. Thus, bridging across communities
would have a negative impact on many towns in
our sample.
Table 4. New Firm Location Choices: Manufacturing versus Non-Manufacturing, Estimates
Dependent variable: # of new
businesses in sector–
zip code–year cell
(1) Baseline: New non-
mfg. businesses
(2) Estimates for explanatory variables
interacted with a dummy for new mfg.
businesses
Cluster specialization 0.022 (0.019) −0.064 (0.059)
Local competition 0.522 (0.095)*** −0.010 (0.348)
Industrial diversity 6.737 (0.626)*** −4.577 (3.762)
Proximity to upstream firms 1.366 (0.148)*** −1.635 (0.670)**
Proximity to downstream firms 0.365 (0.060)*** 0.114 (0.387)
Education 2.638 (0.352)*** 6.711 (2.134)***
Income 0.020 (0.003)*** −0.053 (0.020)***
Bonding social capital 0.142 (0.019)*** <0.001 (0.130)
Bridging within community −0.042 (0.012)*** 0.038 (0.077)
Bridging across communities −0.043 (0.021)** −0.149 (0.136)
Government expenditure-to-tax ratio 0.047 (0.020)** 0.227 (0.109)**
Amenity 0.062 (0.017)*** −0.199 (0.112)*
Distance to closest MSA −0.272 (0.841) −4.624 (5.395)
County seat 0.315 (0.048)*** 0.839 (0.317)***
Log-likelihood −5,597.04
# of sector–zip code–year cells 19,698
Note: Poisson estimates are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. The model includes sector-year dummy variables. A null hypothesis that all interaction










Cluster specialization 0.02 −0.03
Local competition [0.52] [0.51]
Industrial diversity 5.99 1.92
Proximity to upstream firms 0.08 −0.01
Proximity to downstream firms 0.02 0.01
Education 0.61 2.03
Income 1.02 −1.62
Bonding social capital 0.80 0.83
Bridging within community −0.31 −0.03
Bridging across communities −0.26 −1.23
Government expenditure-to-tax ratio 0.13 0.76
Amenity 0.14 −0.31
Distance to closest MSA −0.01 −0.24
County seat [0.32] [1.15]
Note: For local competition (county seat), proportional changes in firm entry probability going from the absence of a competitor (county seat designation) to the
presence of a competitor (county seat designation) in the town-sector market are reported in a bracket.
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We conduct a robustness test for social cap-
ital by using two association density variables
following Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwa-
ter (2006). One is an Olson-type group den-
sity, and the other is a Putnam-type group
density. The Olson-type groups are rent-seek-
ing organizations, including political organiza-
tions, labor organizations, business
organizations, and professional organizations
(Olson 1982). In contrast, the Putnam-type
groups are social interaction groups, including
civic organizations, bowling centers, golf clubs,
fitness centers, sports organizations, and reli-
gious organizations (Putnam 1993). Estimation
results are reported in the second column of
table 8. The estimated coefficient for the
Olson-type group density (0.041) is insignifi-
cantly positive, whereas the corresponding
Table 6. New Firm Location Choices: 1995 versus 2005 versus 2014, Estimates
Dependent variable: # of new firms









interacted with a year
dummy for 2014
Cluster specialization −0.034 (0.059) 0.036 (0.065) 0.048 (0.066)
Local competition 0.389 (0.186)** 0.216 (0.223) −0.137 (0.291)
Industrial diversity 6.853 (1.466)*** −0.174 (1.644) −1.217 (2.888)
Proximity to upstream firms 0.916 (0.301)*** −0.026 (0.361) 1.597 (0.589)***
Proximity to downstream firms 0.296 (0.071)*** 0.563 (0.250)** 1.408 (0.497)***
Education 4.426 (0.977)*** −2.507 (1.074)** −1.052 (1.265)
Income 0.010 (0.008) 0.014 (0.009) 0.004 (0.011)
Bonding social capital 0.069 (0.048) 0.083 (0.054) 0.106 (0.072)
Bridging within community −0.068 (0.032)** 0.047 (0.034) −0.055 (0.052)
Bridging across communities 0.034 (0.065) −0.101 (0.070) 0.009 (0.088)
Government expenditure-to-tax ratio 0.082 (0.101) −0.019 (0.104) −0.025 (0.108)
Amenity 0.014 (0.044) 0.032 (0.048) 0.127 (0.065)*
Distance to closest MSA 2.221 (2.321) −2.448 (2.519) −6.363 (3.410)*
County seat 0.446 (0.124)*** −0.125 (0.137) −0.400 (0.190)**
Log-likelihood −5,576.87
# of sector–zip code–year cells 19,698
Note: Poisson estimates are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. The model includes sector-year dummy variables. A null hypothesis that all interaction




Table 7. New Firm Location Choices: 1995 versus 2005 versus 2014, Elasticities
Variables (1) 1995 (2) 2005 (3) 2014
Cluster specialization −0.02 <0.01 0.01
Local competition [0.39] [0.61] [0.25]
Industrial diversity 5.95 5.99 5.08
Proximity to upstream firms 0.04 0.04 0.13
Proximity to downstream firms 0.01 0.04 0.08
Education 0.81 0.41 0.99
Income 0.43 1.22 0.77
Bonding social capital 0.44 0.89 0.84
Bridging within community −0.54 −0.14 −0.98
Bridging across communities 0.24 −0.44 0.21
Government expenditure-to-tax ratio 0.19 0.19 0.19
Amenity 0.03 0.10 0.32
Distance to closest MSA 0.11 −0.01 −0.20
County seat [0.45] [0.32] [0.05]
Note: For local competition (county seat), proportional changes in firm entry probability going from the absence of a competitor (county seat designation) to the
presence of a competitor (county seat designation) in the town-sector market are reported in a bracket.
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estimate for the Putman-type group (−0.029) is
significantly negative. These results seem quite
consistent with the original results in table 3 if
the Olson-type groups are related to bonding
social capital, and the Putnam-type groups are
related to bridging social capital.
Local Factors and Decadal Employment
Growth
As a robustness test, we examine whether
local factors used in our model affect employ-
ment growth over next ten years. The depen-
dent variable is a dummy variable indicating
whether employment is increased in sector–
zip code pair in 1994–2004 (or 2004–2014)
rather than the employment growth rate
because there are many sector–zip code pairs
with zero existing employment in the start
year. Probit estimates are reported in table 9.
The first column is for 1994–2004, and the sec-
ond column is for 2004–2014. Estimated coeffi-
cients for most agglomeration measures and
human capital are significant persistently,
which suggests that local factors that had
stronger impacts on new firm entry still have
significant impacts on employment growth.
Recall that agglomeration and human capital
variables had stronger impacts on new firm
entry than other variables in table 3.
Discussion
Small towns are finding it increasingly difficult
to attract new firm entry, but there is substan-
tial variation in the pace of new firm entry.
Consistently over twenty years, the towns
attracting themost entrants were the ones with
the greatest endowment of human capital and
high levels of agglomeration. Coupled with
local natural amenities whose importance on
firm entry has been growing over time, there
are no policy options that are sufficiently effec-
tive to reverse the disadvantages of weak
human capital and natural endowments or
the lack of agglomeration advantages. Local
Table 8. New Firm Location Choices: Interactions of Social Capital Measures with the Distance
to Closest Metro Area, and Alternative Social Capital Measures
Dependent variable: # of new
businesses in sector–zip code–
year cell
(1) Interactions of social capital
measures with the distance to
closest metro area
(2) Alternative social capital
measures
Cluster specialization −0.008 (0.022) −0.020 (0.023)
Local competition 0.543 (0.093)*** 0.647 (0.092)***
Industrial diversity 6.183 (0.621)*** 6.643 (0.611)***
Proximity to upstream firms 1.169 (0.140)*** 1.283 (0.138)***
Proximity to downstream firms 0.344 (0.059)*** 0.401 (0.058)***
Education 2.865 (0.351)*** 2.206 (0.330)***
Income 0.012 (0.003)*** 0.008 (0.003)***
Bonding social capital −0.006 (0.030) —
Bridging within community −0.084 (0.020)*** —
Bridging across communities 0.075 (0.038)* —
Distance × Bonding 3.501 (0.536)*** —
Distance × Bridging within
community
0.757 (0.333)** —
Distance × Bridging across
communities
−2.456 (0.619)*** —
Olson-type group per 1,000 people — 0.041 (0.032)
Putnam-type group per 1,000 people — −0.029 (0.009)***
Government expenditure-to-tax ratio 0.086 (0.020)*** 0.025 (0.020)
Amenity 0.038 (0.017)** 0.036 (0.016)**
Distance to closest MSA −13.535 (4.537)*** 0.902 (0.811)
County seat 0.370 (0.048)*** 0.552 (0.042)***
Log-likelihood −5595.18 −5,649.63
# of sector–zip code–year cells 19,698
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governments that can attract intergovernmen-
tal transfers have an advantage in attracting
new start-ups, but the impact is too small to
make up for the locational disadvantages. Sim-
ilarly, social capital has a net positive effect,
but even smaller than that of intergovernmen-
tal transfers.
These results suggest a regional rural devel-
opment approach that encourages firm entry
in rural towns with greater endowments of
human capital and local agglomeration would
be more successful than trying to promote firm
entry in all rural towns. This approach relies
on human capital and market agglomeration
in bigger towns. It seems that smaller rural
towns could band together with a larger town
to have a coordinated labor shed strategy
where the focus is to bring jobs to the regional
labor market hub that would employ workers
from all the surrounding small towns. All the
towns may benefit when their residents can
access jobs within the commuting area and
not just the residents in the town housing the
jobs. Khan, Orazem, and Otto (2001) showed
that county populations respond positively to
job growth within a two-county radius, not just
to job growth in the county itself. Job creation
in bigger rural towns would provide job oppor-
tunities to residents in the smaller surrounding
towns, help the surrounding towns retain pop-
ulation, and thus reduce the overall
population decline in rural areas.20 Testing
whether bigger rural towns have a labor-shed
commuting relationship with smaller sur-
rounding towns remains for future research.
Rural development is funded by all levels of
governments. Among federal government
agencies, the U.S. Department of Agriculture
is the lead agency for rural development and
provides funds for rural business development
and rural infrastructure including broadband
deployment. However, a small portion of
2018 Farm Bill expenditures is allocated for
rural development. The share of projected
outlays in Rural Development Title under
the 2018 Farm Act, 2019–2023 is less than
1%.21 Although some other titles provide
funds for rural development (for example,
Farmers Market Promotion Program and
Local Food Promotion Program in Horti-
culture Title), the aggregate expenditure
share for rural development is still small.
Table 9. Impacts of Local Factors on Decadal Employment Growth
Dependent variable: Whether employment
was increased in sector–zip code pair in the
indicated time period (1) 1994–2004 (2) 2004–2014
Cluster specialization 0.081 (0.012)*** 0.061 (0.007)***
Local competition 0.165 (0.063)*** —
Industrial diversity 2.147 (0.542)*** 1.358 (0.766)*
Proximity to upstream firms −0.307 (0.217) 1.811 (0.275)***
Proximity to downstream firms 0.325 (0.193)* 1.400 (0.312)***
Education 1.408 (0.419)*** 1.238 (0.518)**
Income 0.007 (0.003)** 0.006 (0.004)
Bonding social capital 0.065 (0.020)*** 0.138 (0.026)***
Bridging within community −0.039 (0.014)*** −0.016 (0.016)
Bridging across communities −0.012 (0.027) −0.060 (0.033)*
Government expenditure-to-tax ratio 0.041 (0.047) −0.012 (0.029)
Amenity −0.048 (0.018)*** 0.024 (0.023)
Distance to closest MSA −2.143 (1.100)* −1.793 (1.250)
County seat 0.171 (0.061)*** −0.099 (0.074)
Log-likelihood −3,478.07 −2,194.12
# of sector–zip code pairs 6,566 6,566
Note: Probit estimates are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include sector dummy variables. In the second column, local competition is




20Our approach is different from Olfert and Partridge’s (2010)
relying on urban agglomeration economies. They argue that
improving rural residents’ access to urban labor markets through
better commuting opportunities from rural towns to urban areas
would promote rural economic growth. However, their approach
is not applicable to small rural towns that do not have urban areas
within a commutable distance. In contrast, our approach is appli-
cable to these remote towns by binding them with a larger town.
21https://www.ers.usda.gov/agriculture-improvement-act-of-
2018-highlights-and-implications (accessed on May 23, 2020).
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Some resources are available for rural
development from other federal agencies,
such as the Economic Development Admin-
istration and Small Business Administra-
tion. State and local governments have
rural development programs, which are
likely to be business tax incentives and
other cash incentives.22 More than 90% of
state and local economic development pro-
gram expenditures are in the form of busi-
ness tax incentives and other cash
incentives (Bartik 2019).
Bartik’s (2020) review of estimated economic
impacts of place-based policies finds that the
benefit–cost ratios of local development policies
are greatest in distressed areas, which suggests
that the net benefits of our rural development
approach would be substantially large. Recall
the economic distress in rural towns illustrated
in figure 1. His review also finds that the job cre-
ation cost for public services to businesses
(e.g. infrastructure, job training, and business
advice) is much smaller than for business incen-
tives, which suggests that rural development pol-
icies need to rely more on public services to
businesses.23 However, the composition of rural
development packages should be customized
based on local conditions. For example, some
towns need more infrastructure, whereas others
need more business advice.
To sum up, rural development policy should
focus on bigger rural towns with higher human
capital endowment and agglomeration, and
provide employment opportunities to resi-
dents in surrounding small rural towns. Rural
development policy should use public services
to businesses more often than business incen-
tives. This line of rural development policy
would be more effective than focusing on
every single rural town and using business
incentives only.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material are available at
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
online.
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